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ABSTRACT
Presented herein are techniques for correlating the output of a crowd counting
machine learning (ML) algorithm, which operates on surveillance video, with observed
network load to determine if a load spike is due to a valid network usage or an attacker
trying to sabotage the network. The techniques presented herein include vision field
classification based on access point (AP) coverage, linking of vision fields to AP coverage
in DNAC UI, and consensus-based threat assessment and alerts.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Wireless networks deployed in public venues (e.g., airports, stadiums, etc.) exhibit
large variance in traffic volume characteristics, depending on the number of occupants and
their mobility patterns. For instance, in an airport, it is expected to see network capacity
usage spiking at the access points near the gate/terminal at which an aircraft arrives. A
problem with conventional techniques is that there is no way to determine whether the
capacity increase is due to real users or a fake capacity load created by an attacker/jammer.

Section 1: Solution Summary
The techniques presented herein propose correlating the output of a crowd counting
machine learning (ML) algorithm, which operates on surveillance video, with observed
network load to determine if the load spike is due to a valid network usage or an attacker
trying to sabotage the network. In general, the crowd counting algorithm will leverage out
of band information from co-located camera systems or other third party security systems
that provide a programmable application program interfaces (APIs), such as programmable
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programmable security system APIs. The techniques presented herein include vision field
classification based on access point (AP) coverage, linking of vision fields to AP coverage
in DNAC UI, and consensus-based threat assessment and alerts.
Wireless attackers are difficult to classify since there is no physical connection
which identifies devices in the wired world. This makes the detection of such attackers all
the more difficult. Moreover, unlike wired networks where attacks can be launched from
a different continent, by the nature of wireless channels themselves, a wireless attacker
needs to be in proximity to the access point to launch an attack. As such, the techniques
presented herein address an important problem where, by correlating a wireless user
location with certain vision fields, the chances of catching an attacker (if any) on camera
are significantly increased. Additionally, if the attack is conducted using an RF-jammer,
in a regular case there are no simple solutions except just changing wireless channels.
However, using the techniques presented herein, a deterrent is created by capturing the
attacker on video or pictures. This also helps to confirm the identity and location of the
jammer (if any).
Section 2: Design Overview – Camera-Augmented Security System
An example deployment for a Camera-Augment Security System, as proposed
herein, is shown below in FIG. 1.

FIG. 1
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As shown, the deployment includes cameras that are co-located with access points.
In certain deployments, the cameras have video coverage over the typical service area of
access points. The inputs from the cameras are fed into a camera-augmented threat
classification engine. This ML classification engine takes into account both the images
from the cameras as well as network statistics provided from the access points (e.g., via the
controller). The output from the ML classification engine is fed to a controller for alerts
and display. Each of the components within the deployment are explained in further detail
below.

Section 3: Vision Field Correlation with AP coverage
A vision field is defined as the area on a floor which is visually seen by a camera.
The first design challenge for the proposed approach is the matching of the images from
the cameras (vision fields) with the coverage area of the access point. In one embodiment,
the programmable cameras are coupled with access points at the time of deployment
through a provisioning step. In another embodiment, an automatic discovery mechanism
may be employed.
Section 4: Consensus Based Threat Assessment and Alerts
For the purpose of threat classification, the techniques presented herein use an ML
approach that jointly looks at the network statistics from the access point and the image
output from the corresponding vision fields of the cameras. In one example, a smart threat
detection and classification architecture is designed as shown below in FIG. 2.
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FIG. 2
In this embodiment, two (2) ML components, one for image classification and one
for threat classification, are employed and run based on network statistics. The output of
both of these components are probabilities of certain events which are fed into the threat
analytics decision box. A description of how each of these components are setup and
used is provided below.
Image Classified Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
There are a number of third party and open source neural network engines which
can do image classification. In accordance with the techniques presented herein, the
classifier is trained to flag images from the cameras that correlate with high usage vs those
that do not. It is important to note that such an approach will also take into account usage
patterns, such as differentiating a couple of users generating a huge load, a lot of users, or
a jammer.
The output of this classifier is the probability outcome: Num users > Thresh prob
(PGT[i])
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Network Statistics Analytics ANN
Proposed herein is the use of another ANN that independently looks at network
statistics, such as the number of unique MAC addresses seen in a time window, the amount
of traffic passed through the access point, the ratio of uplink traffic to downlink traffic,
data rates used by the traffic, etc. This ANN is a ML engine, which looks at these statistics
and predicts if these are potentially from an attacker or not.
The neural network will use sigmoid activation functions with back propagation.
These will be trained on well-known attack and benign traffic patterns seen in the field for
classification.
The output of this ML engine is a probability TP[i], which indicates if the current
instance of network statistics for AP[i] indicates an attack.
Threat Analytics Decision Box
The threat analytics decision module accepts the following inputs from the two
previous modules for every instance of images relevant to AP[i] and corresponding AP[i]
statistics:
(1) Probability outcome: Num users > Thresh prob = PGT[i];
(2) Threat probability seen at AP[i] which is denoted as TP[i]; and
(3) Traffic load at AP[i] denoted as L[i].
Outcomes (classifications and corrective actions)


Action 1-- If it is a legitimate group of users, then no actions are taken.



Action 2-- If it is disproportionate usage by a few users, the information
could be used to throttle user limits.



Action 3-- If an attacker is observed, this can be flagged to a system
administrator and he/she may use the camera feeds to flag that as actual
events or false detects.

In one embodiment, the module performs the following:
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In this case, the classifier's output can be used to compare what is observed through
network statistics (e.g., approximate clients or traffic generating unique mac addresses). In
this case, three simple classification buckets, such as (1) <10 users, (2) 10 to 20 users, and
(3) >20 users could be generated. This output of the classifier could be used to match with
what is observed in the network monitoring.
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Section 5: Linking of Vision Fields to AP Coverage in DNAC UI
Once the images are matched (cameras and their outputs) with the coverage area of
wireless access points, the techniques presented may employ section in the UI where a user
can click an access point on the topology and see the images of the coverage area. Such
an approach in the UI uniquely ties the network maintenance with smart camera outputs.
Section 6: Discussions
In general, the techniques presented herein are ML independent and are not tied to
one type of ML for crowd counting and classification. In fact, in another embodiment, the
techniques presented herein can separately leverage more than one third party or open
source applications for this process.
Additionally, the techniques presented herein are camera hardware independent
and can leverage any programmable hardware for the deployment.
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